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How to Improve the Reliability of Expert Systems 
Alan Bundy 
Abstract 
Reliability is likely to become an increasingly important issue for knowledge engineers. 
Without assurances of reliability they will be restricted in the scale and scope of the expert 
systems they can build and will not be able to capitalise on their current success. The 
key to greater reliability is a sound theoretical foundation for current and new knowledge 
engineering techniques - making knowledge engineering a proper engineering science. We 
illustrate the kind of theoretical work that is required with a few case studies, in the areas 
of search control, fault diagnosis and learning. 
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1 Introduction 
The UK expert system community has been very successful in the development of small scale, 
commercial, nile-based, expert systems. A typical example is a fault diagnosis system for a piece 
of specialized hardware, consisting of a set of less than 100 rules, running on a PC, in one of the 
many commercial shells. Part of the success consists of the unexpected (to me anyway) discovery 
of a large number of commercially interesting problems which yield to such a simple mechanism. 
UK knowledge engineers have also been active in building much larger expert systems, with 
hundreds or even thousands of rules. In addition, they have experimented with alternative knowl-
edge representation and reasoning techniques, e.g. frames, objects, semantic nets, etc. This use 
of large scale expert systems and of alternative and/or multiple knowledge representations has 
been more typical of the US market, but both are becoming more important here. 
I pay tribute to the success of UK knowledge engineering, but in this paper I want to look 
beyond it and see what we need to do now in drder to lay a solid foundation for future success. 
To see what might be required in the future we must first explore the limitations of existing 
systems. The main limitation I will focus on is the, unreliability of current expert systems. This 
is an important topic in its own right, but assumes greater importance in the context of the shift 
to both larger scale and to alternative and mixed knowledge representations. Unreliability often 
increases as the system gets larger; large collections of rules are more likely to be inconsistent, 
incomplete or to interact in unpredicted ways, because it is harder for humans to check them 'by 
hand'. Unreliability is also likely to increase when alternative knowledge representation formalisms 
are used, because these new formalisms are often poorly understood or are combined in poorly 
understood ways. 
2 Unreliability 
What do we mean by the term unreliable as applied to an expert system? It is a catch-all term, 
and can include any of the following overlapping phenomena. 
• Pragility (non-robustness): The system may fail in unexpected ways. 
• Unpredictability: The user either cannot specify the circumstances under which the sys- 
tem will produce an answer or cannot specify the type of answer that will be produced. 
• Brittleness (non-flexibility): The system cannot deal with problems on which it has not 
been previously tested. 
• Discontinuity: The system gives very different output in response to similar input. 
All of these phenomena are undesirable in a commercial product. In a real time situation, 
unreliability can cause chaos. In a life critical situation, unreliability can be fatal. Even in more 
mundane situations, unreliability can cause expensive mistakes and lead to users rejecting the 
product. The unreliability of expert system sheila and toolkits makes it diflicñlt for a knowledge 
engineer to decide whether a particular toot will help solve the current problem; thus it is difficult 
to advise customers whether their problems are soluble by current techniques or to predict whether 
a knowledge engineering project will be successfuL Thus reliability is a very desirable feature both 
for suppliers and users of expert systems. 
Contrast the situation of expert systems with more mature branches of engineering. Before 
building a bridge, a structural engineer makes a number of drawings and carries out elaborate 
calculations. These calculations enable the engineer to predict the behaviour of the bridge under 
a wide variety of stresses. As a result the engineer can say, with confidence, that for a specific 
range of loading and weather conditions the bridge will behave robustly, predictably, flexibly and 
continuously. If the engineer does not carry out these calculations or does so inaccurately, and 
the bridge falls down, then he/she is guilty of professional negligence (cf the Tay Bridge disaster). 
3 Causes of Unreliability in Expert Systems 
There is not, yet, the same tradition in the field of knowledge engineering. In fact, there is a 
common assumption that analogous assurances of reliability could not be given; that algorithms 
do not exist on which analogous calculations could be based; that the heuristics on which expert 
systems are based lead to an inherently unreliable product. 
I will argue that this is wrong. It is possible to base expert systems upon techniques which 
lend themselves to the giving of reliability assurances. Some work of this kind already exists and 
I will outline it below. 
However, it is true that existing knowledge engineering practice leads to unreliable products. 
For instance, the following practices are of that kind. 
• The mixing of control and factual information in the same rule. 
• The attachment of arbitrary procedures to rules. 
• The use of multiple knowledge representation formalisms without a clear understanding of 
their relationship to each other. 
• The use of "uncertainty factors" without a clear understanding of their meaning. 
• The incremental development of systems by patches and hacks, and without consideration 
of the whole system. 
• A lack of theoretical understanding of the techniques used in the system's development. 
The last of the these points, a lack of theoretical understanding 1 is a generalization of the others. 
We will use it below as a summary of the causes of unreliability. 
This kind of bad practice is encouraged by existing expert system shells, toolkits and knowledge 
representation systems. For instance, most expert system shells provide a facility for attaching 
numbers to rules and facts to represent 'uncertainty", but few explain what these numbers mean. 
Many alternative interpretations are possible. This may cause the numbers to be used differently 
by different knowledge engineers and users, leading to a clash of expectations about the expert 
system and, hence, to unreliability. 
Suppose an expert system for crime detection is investigating the murder of Mary. When it 
asks a witness whether John hated Mary, the witness can choose a range of options between 1, 
meaning 'no", and 5, meaning 'yes". What would an answer of 3 mean? The system's designer 
may have intended 3 to mean a mild form of hate. The rules of the system will embody this 
meaning and draw appropriate inferences from it. However, the witness might use 3 to mean that 
someone hated Mary intensely, but that it might not have been John. Consequently, the expert 
system may fail to suggest a culprit for Mary's murder or may suggest an innocent person. 
Most toolkit systems (e.g. ART, KEE, LOOPS, etc) offer a range of different knowledge 
representation formalisms, e.g. rules, frames, objects, semantic nets, isa hierarchies, procedures, 
but no account of the relationship between them. The user of the toolkit is faced with the difficult 
choice of choosing an appropriate representational formalism. The representational scopes of the 
formalisms overlap considerably. For instance, a relationship of membership between an element 
and a set may be represented as a predicate in a logical assertion, an arc in an isa hierarchy or 
a slot in a frame. However, the toolkit may not be capable of translating between equivalent 
representations. So if a mixture of formalisms is used the toolkit may not be able to combine 
the knowledge effectively. More confusing still, the toolkit may translate between the formalisms 
only some of the time, so that the user is unable to predict when two pieces of knowledge will be 
effectively combined and when they will not, [Inder 87b]. At the root of the problem is a lack of 
theoretical understanding of the relationship between the formalisms, for instance, is the slot in 
a frame merely syntactic sugar for a logical assertion or is it something subtly different? 
4 Resolution: A Model of Propriety 
Among this collection of, mostly unreliable, knowledge-engineering techniques, one family stand 
out as a model of respectability and reliability: the techniques of logical deduction used in auto-
matic theorem proving and logic programming, e.g. resolution. The reliability of resolution-like, 
deduction techniques is given by their semantics, and by the soundness and completeness theorems 
that accompany these semantics. How does this work? 
The semantics of a logical formalism is a systematic way of assigning meaning to its expres-
sions. The semantics of predicate calculus (a/ca first order logic) was invented by Tarski. Since 
then semantics have been given for other types of logic, e.g. by Kripke for modal logics. Each 
symbol of the logic is of a particular kind, e.g. constants, variables, functions, predicates, etc. An 
interpretation of predicate logic consists of a set of objects, called the universe, and some map-
pings on this universe. The constants of the logic refer to particular objects in the universe, the 
variables range over the objects, the functions refer to mappings from objects to objects, and the 
predicates refer to mappings from objects to truth values. Interpretation independent mappings 
are associated with the logical connectives and quantifiers, e.g. the implication arrow, -; the 
conjunction symbol, &; and the universal quantifer, V. Tarskian semantics uses these mappings 
to calculate the references of complex expressions from the references of their sub-expressions. 
So, for instance, we might choose the set of real world objects as the universe. We might 
associate with the predicates gun and weapon, mappings from each object, o, in this universe to 
the set {true, false} such that gun(o) is true if and only if o is a gun and weapon(o) is true if 
and only if o is a weapon. Under this interpretation the complex expression: 
'/X gun(X) -. weapon(X) 
is forced to have the reference true, since in the real world all objects that are guns are also 
weapons. 
An expert system rule or fact can be regarded as a formula of (predicate) logic if it can be 
interpreted as having a (Tarskian) semantics. In a knowledge base, consisting of a set of such 
logical formula, we would obviously want them all to have the same semantics. It is up to the 
author of a knowledge base to say what universe its variables range over, what its constants refer 
to, and what mappings to associate with its functions and predicates. A reference can then be 
calculated for each formula in it. The author of the knowledge base will almost certainly want the 
reference of each formula in it to be true. An interpretation in which each member of a knowledge 
base is true, is called a model of that knowledge base. If a formula is true in every model of a 
knowledge base, then it is called a logical consequence of that knowledge base. 
The pay-off of this investment is that any formula, C, deduced by resolution from a knowledge 
base, K, will be a logical consequence of K. This is the soundness theorem of resolution. In 
addition, every logical consequence of K can be deduced by resolution from it. This is the 
completeness theorem of resolution. 
What this means to the user of a resolution-based expert system shell is that it is possible to 
have some weak form of prediction about the behaviour of the system. To get the benefit the user 
must try to write true rules and facts according to some specific assumptions about what objects 
exist in the universe and what the other symbols in the knowledge base mean. The user should 
add sufficient rules and facts to the knowledge base so that only the intended interpretations are 
models of all of them. The shell will then be guaranteed to draw all and only those conclusions 
which are true in all these model. This does not prevent the user being surprised at some of 
the conclusions which are true in these models, but it does curtail some of the wilder flights of 
inference to which expert systems are prone. 
The user can also use resolution to test if the knowledge base is inconsistent. If it is inconsistent 
then it will have no model, i.e. there will be no circumstance in which all the rules and facts are 
simultaneously true. In this case resolution is guaranteed to be able to deduce false from them. 
So to test for inconsistency, resolution can be set loose on the knowledge base: if it deduces false 
then the knowledge base is inconsistent; if it does not, then the knowledge base is consistent. 
Unfortunately, there is no time limit to how long this might take - you could wait a long time 
and still not be sure whether false has just not been deduced yet or never will be. 
The theory underlying resolution thus makes possible some procedures, analogous to the bridge 
builder's calculations, which enable certain predictions to be made about the behaviour of an 
expert system. Consider what reliabillty assurances are made possible by these calculations. 
• Robustness: The system will not fail to deduce a conclusion if it is a logical consequence 
of the knowledge base. 
• Predictability: The user can specify that the system will deduce a conclusion if and only 
if it is a logical consequence of the knowledge base. 
• Flexibility: The system can deduce any logical consequence of the knowledge base, even 
though the user has not tested this deduction in advance. 
• Continuity: If two similar knowledge bases both share the same models, then the same 
conclusions will be deduced from them. 
Thus the burden of reliability assurance is shifted from the procedure of deduction to the 
semantic concept of logical consequence. These assurances fall a long way short of what we would 
like. They still leave a large burden on the user in designing a knowledge base with just the 
intended models and, hence, just the intended logical consequences. They give no assurances 
about the amount of effort required to deduce a logical consequence. in addition, they only apply 
to a situation in which logical deduction is being applied to a knowledge base. They do not apply 
to other kinds of reasoning, e.g. learning or inference involving uncertainty However, they are a 
start. In the next section we consider how they might be strengthened and extended to other 
kinds of reasoning. 
5 Does this Idea Generalise? 
In order to develop similar kinds of reliability assurance for expert systems based on other knowl-
edge engineering techniques we must first develop similar kinds of theoretical frameworks. But 
before we can do this we have to define the other knowledge engineering techniques in ques-
tion. The resolution family of logical deduction techniques is not just unusual in having a clear 
theoretical framework, but is also unusual in being clearly defined. 
Basic AT research can be seen as the attempt to develop a loose collection of computational 
techniques of which resolution is one, jBundy 861. New techniques are often developed using 
exploratory programming, and Al researchers have not been diligent in separating them clearly 
from the program in which they were invented, nor in analysing their theoretical properties, nor 
in using such an analysis to extend and generalise them. The Catalogue of Artificial Intelligence 
Techniques, fBundy 841, is an attempt to identify, informally define, and catalogue A! techniques. 
Mathematical logic is one of the most promising mathematical tools for the formal definition, 
analysis and extension of these informally defined techniques. 
A major aspect of the formal analysis of knowledge engineering techniques is the classification 
of the different kinds of knowledge used in them. For instance, when using exploratory program-
ming, knowledge engineers often include both factual and control knowledge in the same rule. 
However, a resolution-style analysis of the semantics of the rule is concerned only with its factual 
content; in order not to confuse the analysis it is necessary to separate off the control knowl-
edge, e.g. into a separate meta-level (see section 5.1 below). This separation buys considerable 
computational advantages; it makes possible a simpler semantics which simplifies the tasks of the 
automatic inference and learning of both factual and control knowledge, IBundy 811. 
Similarly, a theoretical analysis of uncertainty cannot be given without separating the different 
kinds of uncertainty that the knowledge engineer may entwine into the same value. In the example 
above we saw that an uncertainty value of 3 applied to the fact 5 John hated Mary" is ambiguous; 
it could be modifying either its intensity or the identity of the hater (or hatee). If the fact were 
represented by the logical formula hatc(John, mary)' then the ambiguity can be represented by 
considering the uncertainty value as applying either to the predicate hate or to the constant John (or mary). 
In addition to all this, there are the more obvious ambiguities about just what the value 3 
means in terms of reduction of intensity or doubts about someone's identity, etc. Sometimes this 
kind of ambiguity can be clarified by interpreting an uncertainty as a probability. For instance, a 
value of 3 (out of 5) applied to the rule: 
hate(M, V) & posse3s(M, W) & wcapon(W) 
-' kill(M, V) 
might mean that person A will kill person B in 60% of the cases in which A hates B and possesses 
tIn this paper we adopt the Prolog convention that words starting with a capital letter represent variables and 
those that do not represent constants, so we have to represent the constant "John as •john. 
a weapon C. Note that this probabilistic interpretation is not available if the uncertainty value 
is taken as a measure of the intensity of the hate or the doubt about the identity of someone. 
Teasing apart the different kinds of knowledge used in expert systems makes it easier to 
develop procedures for reasoning with the different kinds of knowledge. We are then in a position 
to strengthen existing reasoning procedures and to develop new ones. We are also in a position to 
classify users's tasks according to the kind of knowledge they involve and give a prediction about 
which techniques, if any, are appropriate to their solution. 
The sort of work that needs to be done is best illustrated by examples of existing work 
employing this methodology. In the following sections I will give some examples of such work. 
This is not meant to be an exhaustive list: it is limited by available space and my own ignorance. 
5.1 Proof Plans for Guiding Inference 
A major problem with automatic inference techniques is the combinatorial ezplosion: the number 
of possible inference paths that an expert system must explore grows exponentially or worse 
with the number of inference steps. When attempting a non-trivial inference, the expert system 
becomes bogged down in the possibilities. The usual answer to the combinatorial explosion is the 
provision of a heuristic, search control mechanism. A heuristic is a rule of thumb which is not 
guaranteed to work, but often does. Heuristics suggest which paths to explore first. For instance, 
if you are trying to prove a conjecture in which there are two or more occurrences of a term then 
at some point you must apply a rule or fact which reduces those occurrences to one or zero. Such 
rules can be identified syntactically and it is worth trying to apply them before other rules. 
The design and selection of heuristics has been relegated by most workers to the realm of 
'art form'. This is unfortunate. The provision of good heuristics is crucial to the success of an 
expert system afflicted with the combinatorial explosion; i.e. any system whose rules create many 
choice points during inference and in which the inference is deep. Without such heuristics the 
expert system will be unable to draw the required conclusion within a reasonable time, but will 
be bogged down in unpromising parts of the inference process. In order that the user can predict 
whether the expert system is going to succeed in a reasonable time, it is necessary to promote 
the provision of search control from 'art-form' to 'science'. 
My own research group has been exploring how this might be done. We have chosen the 
domain of mathematics because it contains many deep and highly branching, deductive inferences, 
which cause large combinatorial explosions. However, experienced mathematicians have developed 
sophisticated techniques for controlling their search for a proof. 
We have tried to represent this search control knowledge using a logical formalism, which we 
call a ,neta-logic, with its own declarative semantics. To use it to control the search for a proof we 
make deductions with it; a process that we call meta-le vet inference, (Bundy 811. The universe of 
the meta-logic consists of the expressions and proof strategies of the area of mathematics in which 
we are trying to prove theorems: the object theory. Meta-level inference analyses the object-level 
conjecture to be proved and finds an appropriate proof strategy, which it then applies. 
Recently, we have been trying to capture the concept of a proof plan using these techniques. 
Mathematicians, when trying to prove a conjecture, often have a plan of how to proceed. Such a 
proof plan should have the following properties: 
Usefulness: The plan should control the search for a proof. 
• Expectancy: The use of the plan should carry some expectation of success. 
• Incertitude: On the other hand, success cannot be guaranteed. (Most interesting math-
ematical theories have no decision procedure. A proof plan which was always successful 
would amount to a decision procedure.) 
• Name: coUection(Term) 
• Input: Before 
• Output: After 
• Preconditions: occ(Term, Before) = B 
• Effects: occ(Term, Af ter) = A & A <B 
• Tactic: a program for applying collection rules and facts 
Figure 1: Proof Method for Collection 
• Patchability: If the plan should fail it should be possible to patch it by providing alterna-
tive steps for the failing ones. 
if our representation of proof plans can capture the correct balance between 'expectancy' and 
'incertitude', then we can provide a tool for predicting whether an expert system will succeed 
in a reasonable time. Necessarily, such a tool would not be perfect, but it would give as good a 
prediction as it was possible to give, and it could be used to localise the possible causes of failure. 
We see a proof strategy as consisting of a program of proof tactics, [Gordon 791, where each 
proof tactic is a procedure for performing a small part of the proof, e.g. collecting several oc-
currences of an equation unknown into one, IBundy siJ ; unfolding a recursively defined function, 
{Darlington 811; applying mathematical induction. Note that some tactics may fail, causing fail-
ure of the whole strategy. For instance, a tactic for collecting two occurrences of a term into one 
may work by applying a rule drawn from a suitable set. Thus the two occurrences of the term 
John in the goal hate(john, John) may be collected by applying the rule: 
depressed(D) -4 hate(D, D) 
backwards to produce depressed(John). On the other hand, the attempt to collect the Johns in 
possesa(john, John) might fail because no suitable rule was available. 
A proof method is a meta-level specification of a proof tactic. It contains a precondition and 
an effect. Both are descriptions in the meta-logic: the precondition describes the expression that 
the tactic applies to, and the effect describes the expression that the tactic produces if it succeeds. 
An example of the method for collection is given in figure 1. 
A proof plan is a meta-level specification of a proof strategy, i.e. it is a kind of super-method. 
It is so constructed that the preconditions of each of its sub-methods are either implied by its 
preconditions or by the effects of earller sub-methods. Similarly, its effects are implied by the 
effects of its sub-methods. The original conjecture should satisfy the preconditions of the plan; 
the effects of the plan should imply that the conjecture has been proved. Executing a proof plan 
consists of running each of its tactics according to the program it specifies. A proof plan can 
either be hand coded by the system builder, or the techniques of automatic program synthesis 
can be used to construct it. 
This representation meets the specification given above, point by point, as follows: 
• Usefulness: As the tactics run they will each perform a part of the object-level proof. 
• Expectancy: If the conjecture meets the preconditions of the plan and each tactic succeeds 
then the effects of the plan will be true and the conjecture will be proved. 
• Incertitude: However, a tactic may fail, causing failure of the plan. 
Patchability: Since the preconditions and effects of a failing tactic are known, program 
synthesis techniques may be (re)used to patch the gap in the plan with a subplan. 
5.2 Abduction for Diagnosing Causes of Effects 
In the diagnosis of faults in machines or diseases in people, we are interested in working from the 
observed symptoms to discover their underlying causes. This process may be applied recursively: 
working from symptoms to their immediate causes, then to the causes of these causes, and so on 
until we reach something we can regard as a fault/disease. 
Since Mycin, the classic way to automate this process has been by using production rules of 
the form: 
IF ef f ect i is present 
AND effect2 is present 
AND eff ect,, is present 
THEN cause is present with likelihood c 
In Mycin, and many other expert systems, these rules are used backwards, i.e. from suspected 
diseases to observed symptoms. This is a little technical detail that is irrelevant to the discussion 
below, but has the potential to confuse it totally. Please pay attention only to the direction of the 
chain of implications, which is from effects to causes, even if this chain is constructed in reverse. 
IF/THEN production rules like this seem very similar to logical implication rules. Translating 
the above production rule into the logical rule: 
effect j & ef feet2 & ... & effect,, —. cause 	 (1) 
seems like a good way to put it onto a firm theoretical foundation. 
Unfortunately, the semantics of this logical rule gives us some trouble. The causal link runs 
in the opposite direction; causes cause effects, not vice versa. This suggests that the logical 
implication also runs from right to left, that is, if a particular cause is present then some particular 
combination of effects will also be present. This would be represented, logically, as: 
cause —. effect 1 & effect2 & ... & effect,, 	 (2) 
it is not at all obvious that rule 1 holds, i.e. that the presence of this combination of effects 
implies the presence of this cause. The effects may be due to some other cause or combination of 
causes. 
For instance, if we think that a cause of person B possessing an object P is that B bought P 
then the type 1 representation is: 
p083e3s(B, P) --.. buy(B, P) 
whereas the type 2 representation is: 
buy(B, P) —. possess(B, P) 
There is clearly something wrong with the type 1 representation; it is possible to possess something 
without buying it, for instance someone might give it to you or you might steal it. 
This lack of logical implication in rules of type 1 is one reason why, from Mycin onwards, 
knowledge engineers have felt it necessary to attach uncertainty values to production rules; the 
uncertainty expresses the lack of strict logical implication from the effects to the causes. If we use 
logical implications running in the opposite direction, from causes to effects, then we can dispense 
with such uncertainty values 2. 
Unfortunately, if we use implications running from causes to effects then we cannot use de-
duction (as Mycin effectively does) to deduce what faults/diseases are causing the symptoms 
observed. The process of conjecturing hypotheses that might imply a given fact is called abduc-
tion, fKowalski 791. But for a formula to be regarded as the fault/disease causing a symptom, 
it is not enough that the fault/disease logically imply the symptom; some additional conditions 
must be met. Cox and Pietrzykowski, [Cox 861, have recently specified some candidate additional 
conditions, which define what they call fundamental causes. Here are their definitions: 
C is a cause of E with K, where K is some knowledge base, if and only if: 
• C & K -. E must hold, i.e. C together with K must 'account for' E. 
• C is a formula, with no free variables, consisting of some quantifiers followed by a conjunc-
tion of negated and unnegated propositions. The idea is that C represents some concrete 
situation. We do not want to count as a cause anything that is a vague, so we do not want 
to allow disjunction, for instance. Compare the concept of mental model from cognitive 
science, under 87aj. 
C is a fundamental cause of E with K if and only if it is a cause of E with K and it is: 
• Consistent: C & K must have a model. We do not want C to be a cause of E just because 
it is inconsistent with K and, therefore, the conjunction of them implies everything . 
• Non-trivial: C -. E does not hold. We do not want the connection between C and E to 
be a tautology, we want it to involve some knowledge from K in an essential way. 
• Basic: Every consistent cause of C is trivial. We do not want C to itself have a cause. This 
condition makes C be the ultimate cause, e.g. the actual fault or disease. 
• Minimal: For all causes, C' of E, C— C' implies C f.-.. C'. We do not want C to have 
any extraneous material; we want it to be the simplest formula consistent with the other 
conditions. 
In addition, Cox and Pietrzykowski have developed a procedure for conjecturing fundamental 
causes given their effects. This works with rules of the form 2, and is an alternative fault/disease 
diagnosis technique to the Mycin one of using deduction on rules of the form 1. The basic idea of 
the Cox-Pietrzykowski abduction procedure is to apply resolution to K & E and look for dead-
ends in the search space. These dead-ends are sure to be basic causes. They are then processed in 
various ways to ensure that they are also consistent, non-trivial and minimal. This procedure may 
fail to terminate, either in the generation of dead-ends or in the test for consistency. However, if 
it does terminate then the soundness and completeness of resolution can be used to show that it 
generates all and only the fundamental causes of an effect. It can also be easily adapted to find 
basic causes that fail to be fundamental, e.g. are not consistent or minimal. 
For example, let K be the knowledge base: 
(a) hate(M, V) & posse3s(M, W) & weapon(W) 
-. kill(M, V) 
(b) depresscd(D) -. hate(D, D) 
(c) buy(B, F) 
-. possess(B, P) 
(d) gun(C) -. weapon(C) 
2 Unless, of course, we require them for some other reason, e.g. to express partial ignorance about the effect at 
a cause or the cause of an effect. 
5 1n more recent work this condition has been relaxed somewhat, but the new condition is rather more complex, 
and so I have omitted it from this elementary discussion. 
kilI(john, john) 
hate(john,john) possess (john, W) wea on(W) 
rule (b) 
	 rul (c) 	 rul (d) 
deprcaoed(john) buy(john, W) 
	 gun(W) 
Figure 2: Search Tree for Abduction 
Let E be the symptom Jcill(john,john), i.e. John commits suicide. To find the fundamental 
cause of this suicide, we first run a process of deduction on F using K. This generates the search 
tree given in figure 2. 
The last line of figure 2 is, taken together, a dead-end. It is consistent with K, non-trivial and 
minimal. It needs to be processed into the logical form of causes to give: 
3W dcpresscd(john) & buy(john,W) & gun(W) 
i.e. the fundamental cause of John's suicide is that he was depressed and bought a gun. This 
would not satisfy a psychiatrist, but it is the poverty of the knowledge base that is at fault not 
the abduction procedure 
This theoretically based work on abduction puts it on a similar fobting to deduction. The 
user of the abduction procedure has some account of what the procedure finds, i.e. fundamental 
causes, and some assurance that it will find them. When it fails to do so it fails for good reasons, 
i.e. the essentially undecidable nature of the problem, and not because of some kludge in the 
program. 
We have seen that one form of uncertainty has been taken out of the diagnosis process: the 
uncertainty associated with the lack of logical implication in the Mycin-type rules. As a result 
the fundamental causes produced by the abduction procedure are not ordered by uncertainty 
values. If meaningful uncertainty values could be associated with the rules then the abduction 
procedure could easily be adapted to incorporate this 'feature'. These uncertainty values would 
be essentially 'cleaner' than the Mycin ones in that they would not be associated with the lack 
of logical implication, but would reflect only the remaining sources of uncertainty, e.g. ignorance 
about the precise causes of effects, the probability of an effect following a cause, or whatever. 
The only ordering of causes implicit in the abduction procedure is a partial one generated by 
the conditions met by each cause, e.g. a fundamental cause is better than one that is not minimal. 
It would be interesting to experiment with additional conditions: including some domain specific 
ones, and consider the orders implied by them. For instance, some logical expressions might 
be preferred as causes either because they describe faults more likely to occur or because they 
describe more concrete situations. 
It would also be interesting to classify the rules in the knowledge base according to whether 
they represented causal links, and to invent additional conditions in the definition of fundamental 
cause requiring causal and non-causal rules to be used differently, e.g. in the deduction of F from 
C and K. For instance, rules (a) and (c) above seem to express a causal link, whereas (b) might 
be considered part of the definition of depressed and (d) is taxonomic information. The derivation 
of E ought to use at least one causal rule. Possibly, there are other requirements. 
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5.3 Explanation-Based Learning 
One of the most exciting areas of recent research in automatic learning is the development of 
explanation-based learning (EBL) techniques. EBL techniques learn a target concept by gen-
eralising an example. This involves separating the incidental features of the example from the 
essential ones. Similarity-based learning techniques do this by comparing many examples and 
discovering the features common to all of them. In contrast, EBL techniques usually work from 
a single example of a piece of reasoning in which the target concept plays a central role. 
A number of recent researchers have put explanation-based learning on a formal basis, 
[Mitchell 86,KedazCabelli 87,Dejong 861; in particular, they have given an account of EBL in 
terms of logical deduction. We summarise this below. 
Mitchell has stated the EBL problem as follows: 
Given: 
• Target Concept: A high level description of the concept to be learned, but at the wrong 
level of description. 
• Training Example: A description of a particular example of the concept at the right level 
of description. 
• Domain Theory: What we have above called a knowledge base. This can be used to relate 
the right to the wrong levels of description via a deductive chain. 
• Operationality Criteria: A description of what counts as the right level of description, 
typically the listing of 'ok' predicates, etc. 
Determine: 
• Partial Definition: A partial definition of the target concept at the right level of descrip-
tion. 
The basic idea of the procedure is to find a deductive chain linking the training example to 
its partial definition at the right level of description, to generalise this chain abstracting away 
the example specific aspects, and then to use this generalised chain to construct the required 
definition of the target concept. 
An example will illustrate this. We will use the same knowledge base as for the example in 
section 5.2 above 4
. Suppose the training example is: 
(e) depreased(john) 
(f) buy(john, guni) 
(g) gun(gunt) 
and the target concept is kill(X, Y), i.e. we want to learn part of the operational definition of 
killing from a particular example of killing. 
The first step is use the knowledge base to discover why the training example is an example 
of killing. This is done by deducing 
3X,Y kill(X,Y) 
from the knowledge base and the training example. The derivation is represented by the proof 
tree in figure 3. The arcs of the proof tree are labelled with both the rule or fact names and the 
substitutions required to apply the rules. Read T/X as T is substituted for X. 
4 in tact, this knowledge base was first developed by DeJong, [Dejong 861, to illustrate EBL. 
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kill(X, Y) 
V/Y 
hate(M, V) 	 possess(M, W) weapon(I (b)j,
D/M DIV (c)tB/D P1w (d)1G/P 
depr ssed(B) 	 buy(B,G) 	 gun(G) 
(21o!tn/B 	 (j,un1/G 
Figure 3: Proof Tree for EBJA 
hat (B, B) 
	
pos3ess(B, a) ,pweapon(G)= 
=depressed(B) buy(B, C) 
	 gun(G) 
Figure 4: Generalised Proof Tree for EBL 
The second step is to generalize this proof tree. Any uses of the training example and sub-
stitutions associated with such use are deleted from the tree. The remaining substitutions are 
applied to the formulae in the tree. This gives the generalised tree in figure 4. 
The third step is to apply the operationality criteria to decide which predicates in the tree 
are at the right level. Suppose we decide to allow: depressed, buy, gun and weapon. We must 
choose a horizontal slice through the tree which involves only these predicates. Such a slice i5 
marked by a double line in figure 4. We then conjoin the formulae joined by this line and form 
an implication between them and the formula at the root of the tree. This gives: 
depreased(B) & buy(B, C) & weapor4C) -. kill(B, B) 
which is the partial definition of the target concept required. In fact, it is a partial definition of 
a special case of the killing concept, namely suicide. 
This theoretically based work on EBL gives both a clear definition of the purpose of this learn-
ing technique and some assurances about the reliability of the procedure. The partial definition 
of the target concept is an implication between a formula meeting the operationality criteria and 
an instance of the target concept. This implication is a logical consequence of the knowledge 
base; it is formed by unifying a chain of rules from the knowledge base and in programming terms 
is an example of partial evaluation, ISafra 861. The soundness theorem of resolution gives the 
required guarantee that the partial definition is a logical consequence of the knowledge base. The 
completeness theorem gives a guarantee that any logical consequence of the appropriate logical 
form can be produced by the EUL procedure, in particular, that an appropriate training example 
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can be defined to produce each such logical consequence. 
6 Conclusion 
In this paper I have argued that knowledge engineering needs to live up to its name and become 
a proper engineering science: providing the kinds of assurances of reliability that are normal 
in other branches of engineering. The way to do this is to put the techniques used to build 
expert systems onto a sound theoietical basis. The tools of mathematical logic appear to be a 
good basis for doing this, but we need to be imaginative in their use - not restricting ourselves 
to deductive inference, but investigating other aspects of reasoning: search control, abduction, 
learning, uncertainty, alternative knowledge representation techniques, etc. 
This theoretical work is normally seen as being the province of academic researchers, but it 
need not be exclusively so. In any case, th&success of the theoretical work is of crucial importance 
to applied researchers, in industry and elsewhere; without it they will not be able to build reliable 
expert systems. 
The interaction is not all in one direction; applied researchers have important feedback to 
provide on the utility of existing knowledge engineering techniques 'in the field'. Basic researchers 
are particularly interested in the failures of current techniques, so that they may be improved. 
Unfortunately, such failures are usually poorly described in the literature, if they are described 
at all. We need a change of attitude among knowledge engineers, so that the failure of an expert 
system is not seen to reflect badly on its designers, but to be a valuable result of an experiment 
with particular knowledge engineering techniques. 
'Failure' is usually taken to mean the failure of a particular technique to be useful for a 
particular task. I also want to draw attention to failures of reliability, e.g. the user's failure to 
predict just what tasks the technique can succeed on. We will need to know about both kinds of 
failure if we are to build the reliable, large-scale, wider-ranging, expert systems of the future. 
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